Historians of the
Civil War Western Theater
Annual
Meeting: May 19-21, 2000
Chattanooga,
Tennessee
The following notes were taken during the meeting by Nancy Bradley, Raleigh, NC.
Registrants for meeting (Albert Castel and Earl Hess were unable to attend):
Anne Bailey Mike Ballard Stewart Bennett
Mark Bradley Larry Daniel Thomas DeBlack
Nancy Bradley Buck T. Foster Herman Hattaway
Nat Hughes John Hubbell Steven Woodworth
Gary Joiner Mauriel Joslyn John Marszalek
Richard McMurry Jim Ogden William Shea
Clay Williams Keith Bohannon Samuel Elliott
Marszalek welcomed the group and described the history of the organization’s development and growth. He introduced Buck Foster and described his work with the organization’s website and announcement line. Foster and Gary Joiner also are developing an online journal. Member suggestions and contributions were solicited. Buck can be emailed directly via the following website:
Foster displayed a large number of books received from publishers for review. Marszalek requested volunteers to read and review these for website distribution.
Marszalek described the group’s “open forum” discussion format and solicited topics for which views could be productively exchanged.
Anne Bailey was introduced as the newsletter editor of the Society of Civil War Historians, an organization characterized as an offshoot of the parent organization, the Southern Historical Association. The relationship between these organizations and our own group was discussed.
Hughes: Suggested that the group discuss the dichotomy in the Army of Tennessee command. Cited emphasis on local militia as exemplified by Pillow compared to the “West Point” concept promoted by Hardee. What did “Lee / professional soldiers” mean to the Army of Tennessee compared to the Army of Northern Virginia. Emphasized concepts of leadership and command.
McMurry: Leadership occurs at the small unit level (regiment/brigade) while command involves higher levels (division/corps/army). Described medical discharges of regimental/field-grade officers of the Army of Tennessese.
Bruce Allardice noted as currently working on the colonels of the Army of Tennessee.
Hattaway: Cited dichotomy of East vs. West as well as North vs. South. The higher number of military schools in the South and West had a great effect. In the North, it was rare for sergeants and colonels to have had any military training as compared to those at South.
McMurry: Military schools in the West (ex.: Alabama and Georgia schools) sent many men to the ANV. Those units formed first when the war began and went to Virginia.
Hattaway: There were about 35 military schools in the antebellum South with boarding school/barracks life, compared to only 2 in the North.
“Leadership is the effective and articulate response to command.”
Hubbell: Compared situations in the Civil War to those at the division and regimental command levels in the Vietnam War. Discussed the interesting relationship between military education and training and how leadership is evolved or established. Cited expectations of field officers.
Hughes: Company leaders often were community leaders.
Hattaway: Civilian leadership may not translate into military leadership. Referred to the “Jacksonian” concept that “civilian leaders will be good military leaders.” Cited Alfred A. Terry as an amateur with no professional training who became one of only 17 general officers retained. Terry exemplifies an amateur who can become a military professional.
Daniel: Army of the Ohio also had very few West Point officers. Many political generals served at the division level.
Bradley: Sherman’s army promoted men through the ranks on merit.
Bohannon: Army of Tennessee in 1862 had rigorous written examinations for officers. Asked if this were patterned after policies in the regular army.
Bradley: Cited lengthy examinations for the artillery corps. These records are in the National Archives.
Hattaway: This probably was a regular army practice that over time became part of Civil War policy for officers.
Hubbell: Not sure how institutionalized this was.
McMurry: Regular army may have used seniority rather than Board of Examiners for regular army officers.
Ogden: Cited complaints of officers about slowness of promotion.
Hubbell: Chattanooga actually was the key to the Union army position and would have served better than Nashville. Buell’s command ability was poor. Cited criticism of Lincoln’s emphasis on East Tennessee.
Hattaway: A great effort was expended at Knoxville, which was not as important a site.
Hubbell: The enemy army should be the key. Citied criticism of Sherman for failing to engage Johnston. The March to the Sea was felt by some as a means Sherman employed to avoid direct conflict. Yet the capture of Atlanta was a political stroke that re-elected Lincoln.
Several western sites (ex.:
New Orleans, Mobile, Vicksburg, Chattanooga) were crucial for the
Union. Suggested that it would have
been better if the Federals forced the Confederates to confront them at
Chattanooga.
Daniels: Thinks that Polk would not have gotten out. If Chattanooga had been the focus, it would have sent a negative political message to the Trans-Mississippi. Soldiers there refused to cross the Mississippi. Much regional emphasis.
After Vicksburg, there was more emphasis on the Trans-Mississippi, but Davis never had a committed interest in Texas or Arkansas.
Hughes: In the fall of 1861 all Arkansas troops were moved east.
Hubbell: Union soldiers from 5 states in the East fought west of the Mississippi, but no Confederates east of the Mississippi were sent to the Trans-Mississippi.
The Confederate government saw the area west of the Mississippi as a separate entity. Compared to the Union, few areas were seen as a unified theater of operations. Noted that there was no Federal concept of the “Trans-Mississippi.”
Shea: There was a gradient or spectrum from the ANV westward. In Richmond, only on paper was there a “unified” army. The areas west of the Mississippi had effective leadership but lacked command. Ex.: The Missouri State Guard (Trans-Mississippi) had a distinct difference in tone and structure even before Vicksburg. Cited Van Dorn’s abandonment of the region. Speculated how the idea of the immense resources of the Trans-Mississippi meshes with the concept of ignoring that region.
Stated that Vicksburg itself was of no particular importance—Vicksburg-Port Hudson corridor was crucial, however. Cited the mouth of the Red River as the area of real significance due to Federal use of the river for commerce.
Shea : Cited Confederates’ need for immense amounts of supplies transported via river. Emphasized importance of the Vicksburg/Port Hudson corridor and the vital supply line to Texas. The Confederates viewed the Trans-Mississippi less important as a region than as a means of supply from Texas and Europe. The Red and Missouri River contours were of vital importance. Commented on the Confederates’ seeming attitude in Richmond of ignoring this.
In April, 1863, Federal gunboats went below Vicksburg, and from then on, Confederate commerce was disrupted.
Hughes: Agreed that the Confederates’ “writing off” of Missouri early in the war was disastrous.
Ballard: Davis had “written off” Arkansas early after Van Dorn abandoned that state.
Daniel: 4000 Confederates sat in northern Florida when they should have been at Shiloh.
Ogden: Confederate officers were given discretion on how orders were to be carried out.
Marszalek: Questioned relative importance of political vs. military leadership. Ex.: Which was more important: that Bragg was in charge, or that decisions were made at lower levels.
Ogden: Lower level officers kept the Army of Tennessee intact as an “instrument.” A sound political background is needed so that lower officers as well as those at command level can interpret orders. Cited doubt that such a unified aim existed in the CSA.
Marszalek: Questioned whether a good general can overcome bad political leadership. Cited the example that Sherman’s March to the Sea initially was opposed by Lincoln.
Hughes: Cited opposite example of Ft. Donelson, Tennessee, where good Confederate military leadership was needed.
Daniel: The gravest errors in the war were made by West Point military men.
Hughes: Mentioned that Lee was both a military leader and a political presence.
Ogden: Very few generals are successful in implementing political goals. Some were competent militarily but could not mesh with political aims.
McMurry: Emphasized need for good communication.
Bradley: Discussed lack of communication between Johnston and Davis.
Hubbell: Cited Lee’s tact in his discussions with Davis, and other generals’ lack of this quality.
Hattaway: Discussed lack of clarity of Federal orders at Missionary Ridge, and Sherman’s collision with Cleburne. Brigade and division commanders implemented the charge with uncertainty about the objectives. Cited command failure but good leadership on both sides at Chattanooga. Asked group for opinions of the key strategic point between Mississippi and the East.
Ogden: Feels that the strategic point changed during the course of the war.
McMurry: Emphasized that only Davis could have stated this aim, and such a decision was not his concern. Cited Johnston as later saying that the CSA government did not care what was happening.
Hughes: Mentioned some evidence of strategic agreement of the CSA in the fall/winter of 1861.
Shea: Hardee started the Civil War while in Arkansas; it never became part of Kentucky. Discussed generals’ amassing of capital. Questioned whether the ineffectiveness of military generals in 1861-early 1862 reflected the political situation.
Ballard: Western CSA generals wrote to Davis, but discovered that it was useless. They knew that Davis ignored their input.
Hubbell: Lincoln practically pleaded with military officers to take the lead in 1862.
Marszalek: Cited personality differences. Lincoln could dislike someone yet still work with them, while Davis ignored those he disliked. This had an enormous impact on the war.
Daniel: Questioned whether we are developing prejudice for the West. Cited modern revisionism claiming that the war was won in the West, and whether this actually was the popular sentiment at the time. Referred to McMurry’s manuscript on the “Fourth Battle of Winchester” in thinking in terms of the West.
Ogden: Political focus on the Eastern Theater prolonged the war.
McMurry: Virginia was responsible for holding on for so long. The West was responsible for the outcome of the war.
Shea: Mentioned that the sites of the war’s beginning and end were about 100 miles apart. Stated that the war was won in the West. Prefers the question, “What was the effect/purpose/impact of the Civil War in the East?”
Woodworth: The East was an ongoing effort for the South to “short-circuit” what was going on in the West.
Hughes: The South counted on winning the war in the East but failed.
DeBlack: Asked if the South’s “wrongs” were more important than the North’s “rights.” Questioned whether the South’s “doing everything right” would have altered the outcome of the war.
Hughes: It was only a matter of time regarding Union mobilization of forces and resources.
Daniel: The South would have run out of troops vs. the North. Questioned whether the war really was in question before November, 1864.
DeBlack: Asked why the South didn’t understand the military statistics and their implications in 1860 when Lincoln was elected without the Southern vote.
Hattaway: Feels that the Northern “will” was not inviolate.
Hughes: The South misunderstood the Republican Party and underestimated Lincoln’s ability to prosecute the war.
Woodworth: The South’s motivation did not survive the occupation of their territory.
Shea: By the time of Chattanooga, many Confederates were “recycled” from previously-captured soldiers.
Hubbell: Federal armies in the West generally were not demoralized, and many re-enlisted.
Daniel: A “crisis of faith” began with the South in the spring of 1862. They lost so much so soon and suffered devastating casualties. The draft likely held the army together.
Ogden: Cited CSA overconfidence and the belief in a short war.
Hubbell: Concluded that the South did not have a chance to win at Shiloh.
Daniel: The South had no way to get across the Tennessee River at that time.
Hubbell: A “knockout punch” in the Civil War was not really possible due to various circumstances including generals’ abilities, sizes of armies, etc.
Bailey; Bradley: We need to realize that we don’t see things as people did at that time. Lincoln was a politician, and military plans were influenced by the election.
DeBlack: Questioned what the “right thing” was at Atlanta.
Daniel: Once the high country was lost there, the outcome was decided.
McMurry: Johnston failed to fortify Snake Creek Gap. Although he may not have held it long, every day that the Confederates could hold would have been advantageous.
Daniel: Mentioned the three rivers in Atlanta and that Johnston located his works on the wrong side.
Bailey; McMurry: Johnston did not think in political terms.
Woodworth: Davis believed that the Southern will could not be broken, and believed that everyone thought as he did.
Hughes: Hardee thought the military cause was lost well before Atlanta and believes that Johnston felt the same way.
Bohannon: Asked about the popular reaction to the 1862 election. The group commented on the Southern illusion that Lincoln would be defeated and that Confederate troops would go into winter camp or have a negotiated peace.
Marszalek: Affirmed the consensus that the South could not have won except by breaking the Northern will or with foreign intervention.
Daniel: The sacrifice of Northern lives had to be justified by continuing the war.
Shea: Feels that we have overlooked the question of whether the war was won on land or sea in the West. Cited mobility and logistical/firepower support of US naval forces. Emphasized the need to recognize the 19th Century value of rivers in the Civil War.
Ogden: The role of the railroads increased as the war proceeded. Cited the example of central Alabama where, as in other places, the importance of railroads grew later in the war. Emphasized that railroad networks were relatively new to many areas.
Daniel: Asked why Albert Sidney Johnston continue to man Ft. Donelson when he claimed that the battery wouldn’t hold.
Woodworth: Believes that he did so in order to withdraw the garrison.
Shea: The Confederates may never have realized that ironclads would travel upstream beyond forts without army support.
Ogden: Thinks that, early in the war, Joseph E. Johnston failed to see the importance of railroads and realize their potential in the coming months, but emphasized that others failed to do so as well.
McMurry: Agreed that by about 1864 people should have realized the importance of railroads. Mentioned Johnston’s failure to destroy railroads as he retreated.
Bailey: Solicited addresses for those interested in the Southern Historical Association newsletter.
Marszalek: Asked group to briefly describe their current works in progress or areas of special interest. Responses follow.
Joslyn: Cleburne; Irish in the Civil War. Mentioned that her husband is compiling information on individual Georgia units of all ranks.
Woodworth: Completed about 60% of MS on the religious nature of Civil War soldiers; Army of the Tennessee.
Hattaway: 5 books in progress, 2 of which are in press. Collaborating with Behringer on the presidency of Jefferson Davis; collaborating with A. J. Meek (LSU Press) on battlefield parks; working with Ballard on the Civil War in Mississippi; historical atlas of the Confederate military department; Confederate postal system; Shades of Blue and Gray.
Shea: Collaborating with Wintschel on the Mississippi River struggle; working with Hess, Piston, and Hatcher on tour guides for the Ozark and the Nebraska series; starting Pea Ridge sequel on Prairie Grove.
Hubble: Editor for Greenwood; book chapters (Leaders of the Civil War) on generals including Grant and McClellan; plans biography of James B. McPherson; interested in “contrary” ideas of the Civil War.
McMurry: Atlanta campaign; “Fourth Battle of Winchester” (counter-factual history); editing letters of George Knox Miller, a Confederate cavalry officer in Florida; Gulf Coast campaigns; Confederate newspapers.
Ogden: Social and administrative history of a Tennessee regiment.
Bohannon: Georgia Unionists (PhD dissertation); logistics/training/morale of Army of Tennessee.
DeBlack: Arkansas history.
Bennett: Memoirs (extensive) of a 76th Ohio Bvt. Major; Battle of Bald Hill; Atlanta; Arkansas post.
Elliott: Memoirs of Charles T. Quintard, Army of Tennessee chaplain in 1864 (memoirs orig. published in 1905); division command of the Army of Tennessee at the end of the war.
Hughes: Biography of Jeff C. Davis; Mexican War diary of D. H. Hill; Henry M. Stanley (of Stanley and Livingstone).
Foster: Remote sensing applied to history (fellowship with NASA); temporal and structural history; environmental impact of the Civil War (PhD dissertation).
Daniel: Army of the Cumberland (LSU Press); history of Confederate field artillery (Univ. of Alabama Press); mentioned that he would like to expand book on Shiloh, but that Simon & Schuster won’t release it for revision.
Ballard: Vicksburg (UNC Press); miniseries on Grant in 1861-63.
Marszalek: March to the Sea for McWhiney series; “Intimate Strategies” (chapter on Gen.. and Mrs. Sherman); Halleck biography.
Williams: UNC Civil War series: Western Theater; birth of Confederacy exhibit at Jackson, Miss.; Vicksburg; Port Gibson
Bailey: March to the Sea book in Woodworth series; black troops garrisoned in Nashville-Georgia area and the recruiting process.
Bradley: Close of Civil War in NC/surrender negotiations at Bennett Place (UNC Press); exploring PhD dissertation topic.
The group discussed the great need for scholarly publications on Union armies in the West and the availability of source material for both armies there. Forrest and Shiloh were characterized as popular Western topics, whereas Vicksburg was described as long and complex.
The group agreed in their negative reaction to Feldman’s Citizen Sherman. Most of the group had not yet read Brooks Simpson’s new Grant biography; Hattaway reported several negative reviews on the book.
The group decided to hold the 2001 meeting in Arkansas and discussed the logistical problems involved. More detailed information will be reported later.
The 2002 meeting will be held in Raleigh, NC.